Inside the Clockwork of Power: Huawei, Johnson, and the Global Struggle for Technological Supremacy
In horology — the precise study of timekeeping — the mainspring provides the energy, the ratchet stops the unwinding, and a series of wheels and cogs divide the motion into measured intervals. It is a delicate, interlocked mechanism, hidden from view yet essential to order.
Politics, too, has its own clockwork: a hidden interplay of forces, interests and manoeuvres. When Boris Johnson, freshly empowered after his 2019 election victory, decided to allow Huawei a role in Britain’s 5G network, the decision appeared to be the mainspring in motion — a calculated step towards technological progress. Within months, however, the mechanism was forced into reverse by a powerful combination of domestic opposition and international pressure.
The Huawei Reversal
In January 2020, Johnson approved Huawei’s involvement in Britain’s 5G infrastructure, despite the fact that another Chinese telecoms provider, ZTE, had been banned from the UK since 2018 over “national security risks” deemed “impossible to mitigate”.
The backlash was swift. Concerns over security combined with the strategic lobbying of American corporate and political interests. Six months later, on 14 July 2020, Johnson reversed course, ordering the removal of all Huawei equipment from UK networks by 2027.
The reversal came in a post-Brexit environment where the UK was struggling to balance two contradictory ambitions: securing new global trade deals while preserving as much as possible of the economic advantages of the EU single market.
A Prime Minister as Global Trader
Johnson imagined himself a dealmaker in the mould of a buccaneering Del Boy or a wartime Churchill — proud, defiant, and unencumbered by what he saw as constraints. But his decision on Huawei collided with the geopolitical realities of a world in which technological infrastructure is the front line of a deeper struggle: not just for state security, but for economic supremacy.
The Yuan and the Dollar
At the heart of this struggle lies China’s long-term challenge to the supremacy of the US dollar. By keeping the yuan pegged to the dollar, Beijing fuelled its export-led growth, expanding its share of global GDP and trade. In 2015, the IMF granted the yuan reserve currency status; it is now the world’s fourth most-traded currency, overtaking the yen, the Canadian dollar and the Australian dollar.
For some in Washington, Huawei’s global rise is not just a corporate success story, but part of a strategic campaign: to couple Chinese-built telecommunications infrastructure with Chinese currency dominance.
Technology’s Two Pillars
5G technology depends on two complementary pillars. The first — “single-purpose” providers — build the physical infrastructure: Ericsson (Sweden), Nokia (Finland), Samsung (South Korea), Huawei and ZTE (China). The second — “multi-purpose” providers — supply the software, data management and artificial intelligence that make the networks function: Cisco, Dell, Hewlett Packard (all US), and Lenovo (China).
Huawei, uniquely, straddles both spheres. With over $200m in annual government subsidies and $100bn in credit for customers, it can enter markets at a loss, undercutting competitors. It is this dual capability, coupled with Beijing’s broader economic strategy, that most alarms Washington.
The Campaign Against Huawei
Johnson’s January 2020 decision triggered an intense lobbying effort. One key player was the Heritage Foundation, a US conservative think tank with deep connections to the Trump administration and a long-standing hostility to Chinese influence in Western infrastructure.
The Foundation met senior UK officials and Conservative MPs to press for a reversal. Among those leading the domestic campaign was Iain Duncan Smith, a former Conservative leader with close ties to US political networks. In 2018, Smith declared share options in NLYTE Software, a UK company supplying data centre management software to Cisco — a direct competitor to Huawei in the “multi-purpose” sphere.
Other familiar names in the Heritage orbit included Liam Fox, the former trade secretary whose failed promise of “the easiest trade deal in history” with the EU remains a cautionary tale.
The Broader Question
Britain’s relationship with authoritarian states has always involved a selective blindness. Security concerns about Huawei did not prevent a Conservative-led government granting China General Nuclear Power a 30% stake in Hinkley Point C in 2012.
The Huawei episode revealed how swiftly technological policy can be swept into the currents of geopolitics — where corporate competition, national security, and diplomatic positioning form an inseparable tangle.
The Clockwork Lesson
The workings of a clock are intricate, interdependent, and largely invisible until something fails. In the same way, the machinery of global trade, diplomacy and technology policy turns behind closed doors. The Huawei affair exposed the fragility of Britain’s position — not just in its relationship with China, but in its attempt to navigate between the gravitational pulls of the world’s two largest economies.
When the mechanism jams, the damage is often done before the public even hears the ticking stop.